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Abstract
The paper explores the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds,
using Euro area data. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated
with a measure of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable het-
erogeneity and no common factor. We propose a simple model with endogenous liquidity
demand, where a bond’s liquidity premium depends both on its transaction cost and on
investment opportunities. The model predicts that yield differentials should increase in
both liquidity and risk, with an interaction term of the opposite sign. Testing these predic-
tions on daily data, we find that the aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, liquidity
differentials are priced for a subset of countries, and their interaction with the risk factor
is in line with the model’s prediction and crucial to detect their effect.
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1 Introduction
What determines the yield differentials between bonds? Even though re-
search has shown that the moments of bonds’ return distribution and liq-
uidity typically both play a role, we still understand imperfectly the relative
importance of these two determinants and their possible interactions.
The European Monetary Union (EMU) offers a particularly good arena
to examine these issues and sharpen our understanding, because in the euro
area we can observe bonds issued by several sovereign issuers, without the
complications arising from different currencies and different bond conven-
tions, but with variation in liquidity. Even though since EMU’s inception
in 1999 yields on euro-area government bonds converged significantly, these
bonds are still not regarded as perfect substitutes by market participants:
non-negligible differences in yields across countries have remained, to differ-
ent extents for different issuers and maturities, and they fluctuate over time.
Even the bonds issued by AAA-rated issuers are not regarded as perfect sub-
stitutes, so that for example French bonds traded in the cash market are not
seen as a perfect hedge for positions in Bund futures.1
A possible reason for these persistent differentials is persistent risk differ-
ences. Different sovereign issuers are perceived as having different solvency
risks, in spite of the provisions of the Stability Pact. A second possible ex-
planation is liquidity. This is indeed the explanation that is often advanced
by practitioners.
However, a look at the time-series behavior of Euro-area yield differen-
tials suggests that neither one of these two factors in isolation is likely to
provide the full answer. First, as shown below, the yield differentials relative
to the German Bund tend to fluctuate together, much more than measures
of liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, do. This suggests that liquidity alone
cannot be the full answer, and that there must be other factors driving the
differentials’ time-series behavior. Such factors are likely to be related to in-
ternational investment opportunities or global risk perceptions. For instance,
even if the default risk of the Italian and French governments relative to the
German one were very stable over time, a changing world price for risk could
induce the implied yield differentials to fluctuate together. But this cannot
be the full story either. Sizable yield differentials have been observed for sev-
1See Pagano and von Thadden (2004) for an account of the integration of European
bond markets and for a survey of the relevant literature.
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eral years even within the group of AAA-rated euro-zone countries: as late
as 2002, 10-year AAA-rated Finnish debt yielded on average 20 basis points
more than the 10-year German Bund. This suggests that indeed liquidity
differences may play a role, as practitioners claim.2
To analyze these issues, we develop a simple asset-pricing model with
exogenous transactions costs and endogenous liquidity demand. The model
is kept deliberately simple in order to isolate the implications of our key as-
sumption of endogenous liquidity demand. The most important insight of
our theoretical analysis is that liquidity matters for pricing, but that it inter-
acts with aggregate factors in a way that is different from what traditional
CAPM-like asset pricing models would predict.
Our model is based on the idea that the demand for liquidity responds
both to the magnitude of trading costs and to the availability of outside
investment opportunities. First, investors are less inclined to trade securities
with larger trading costs. Second, they are less likely to liquidate securities
when outside investment opportunities are less attractive, a situation which
is assumed to coincide with increased aggregate risk. As a result, when risk is
expected to increase, investors’ demand for liquidity abates, and the premium
they place on more liquid securities declines. Therefore, although in general
investors value liquidity, they value it less when risk increases.
A key ingredient of our model is the insight of Merton’s (1971) Intertem-
poral CAPM that future investment opportunities matter for individual port-
folio choice. In our model, when they choose their portfolio, investors know
that they may want to rebalance it later, when they receive new information
about their exposure to an aggregate factor. Since an increase in aggregate
risk worsens the risk-return profile of non-marketable investments (such as
private equity, for which no price effect compensates for increased risk), at
times of high aggregate risk investors are less likely to liquidate marketable as-
2For instance, the increase of yield differentials relative to the Bund rate in late 1999
was explained as follows: “after having tested the waters of Europe’s smaller bond mar-
kets, institutional investors are deciding they’ve had enough . . . declining liquidity in the
smaller debt markets is boosting the premiums these countries are having to pay investors
compared with the core euro-zone nations” (Wall Street Journal Europe, November 3,
1999). Market practitioners clearly attribute remaining yield differentials to liquidity pre-
mia, which are held to be larger in thinner markets, irrespective of their credit rating:
“‘Peripheral issuers in Europe are in trouble: They’re paying a huge liquidity premium’
says Steven Mayor, chief bond strategist at ING Barings in London. He says that their
problem comes down to the fact that some still only represent 1% to 2% of the euro-zone
issuance” (ibidem).
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sets in order to move into alternative investments. This asymmetry between
marketable and non-marketable assets together with the I-CAPM insight
that heterogenous future investment opportunities impact current prices im-
ply the cross-effect that is specific to our theory. As in any sensible theory,
yields increase in expected transactions costs. But investors in our model
understand that these transactions costs will only be incurred when they re-
balance their portfolio later on, and that the frequency of this re-balancing
decreases in aggregate risk. Hence, the direct effect of transactions costs
(illiquidity) on yields is positive, but this effect is decreasing in aggregate
risk.
These ideas contrast with those embedded in the model by Vayanos
(2004), where the demand for liquidity is not sensitive to trading costs and
increases at times of high risk. In Vayanos’ model, fund managers are subject
to withdrawals due to mutual fund liquidations (or binding margin require-
ments).if their performance falls below a given threshold. Therefore they are
more likely to liquidate at times of high volatility, and these forced sales are
naturally effected through the cheapest channel, i.e. by using the most liquid
assets. So increases in volatility induce a flight to liquidity and an increase in
the liquidity premium. Hence, while anticipated transactions costs increase
an asset’s required yield, as in our setting, this effect is amplified by aggregate
risk: the two models have the same prediction regarding the direct effect of
transaction costs, but the opposite prediction with respect to the interaction
term.
Our model also differs from the CAPM model of liquidity by Acharya
and Pedersen (2004), who implicitly assume that the demand for liquidity
is inelastic to the magnitude of trading costs and that it does not vary pre-
dictably with the fundamental risk of securities. In their model, equilibrium
returns compensate investors for anticipated trading costs (as in our setting),
but also for liquidity risk: unanticipated changes in liquidity are priced to the
extent that they generate covariance risk (due to commonality in liquidity) or
exacerbate fundamental covariance risk. But the premium that investors are
willing to pay for anticipated trading costs does not depend on fundamental
risk, in contrast to both our setting and that by Vayanos.
The empirical implication of our model is that, while both increases in
risk and illiquidity should reduce asset prices and drive up their returns, their
interaction should have the opposite sign — that is, it should increase asset
prices and dampen the increase in their required return. An estimation that
ignores the effect caused by the interaction of liquidity with aggregate risk is
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likely to underestimate the direct impact of liquidity (as well as that of risk)
on prices. We bring these ideas to the data using two years of daily observa-
tions on yields and liquidity variables for Euro-area sovereign bonds at the
5-year and 10-year maturities. The results show that a standard proxy for
aggregate risk — the yield difference between U.S. fixed- interest on swaps and
U.S. government bonds at the corresponding maturity — is the single most
important explanatory variable for Euro-area yield differentials. Liquidity
differentials — as proxied by the difference between the local and the relevant
reference bid-ask spread — play a role only in a subset of countries. Whenever
it appears with a statistically significant coefficient, the bid-ask spread im-
pacts positively the corresponding yield relative to that of the benchmark, as
any asset pricing model would predict. However, different from other models,
its interaction with the aggregate risk factor is negative and precisely esti-
mated. In other words, (i) illiquidity appears to command a premium, as in
most of the literature following Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and (ii) the
size of such premium is reduced by covariation between the cost of illiquidity
and aggregate risk.
To get an idea of the economic magnitude of our estimated effects, con-
sider the case of the 10-years yield differentials on German government bonds.
In the sample that we consider, which covers daily observations in 2002
and 2003, yields differentials fluctuated in a range between minus eight and
twenty-five basis points. Our proxy for aggregate risk instead fluctuated in a
range between twenty-five and eighty basis points, while liquidity differentials
fluctuated between minus four and six basis points. Our estimates show that
in periods of high aggregate risk (where the U.S. swap-bond differential is
higher than seventy basis points) the effect of liquidity on yield differentials
is not significantly different from zero and fluctuations in yield differentials
depend exclusively on the risk factor. But in periods of low aggregate risk
(U.S. swap-bond differentials below thirty basis points) liquidity differentials
have a positive and significant impact on yield differentials: on average, an
increase of one basis point in liquidity differentials is associated with an in-
crease of two basis points in yield differentials (which in these periods are
below ten basis points). Similar qualitative results hold for the 5-year differ-
entials on French government bonds, keeping in mind that these differentials
are on average half the 10-year differentials, so that all measures of impact
have to be reduced proportionately.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 relates the paper to
the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the data and describes the stylized
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facts that emerge from them. Section 4 lays out the model and its predictions.
Section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
In an appendix, we generalize the basic model used in the main text to include
uncertainty and risk aversion. A short second appendix describes our data.
2 Related Literature
This paper adds to a considerable literature on the relation between returns
and liquidity. At a theoretical level, two main views have been advanced
to explain why liquidity should be priced by financial markets: illiquidity
(i) creates trading costs, and (ii) can itself create additional risk. These
views are not mutually exclusive, although they have emerged sequentially
in the literature. This paper builds on the first view and develops it in a new
direction, which is similar in spirit to that of the second view.
The “trading cost view” holds that illiquid securities must provide in-
vestors with a higher expected return to compensate them for their larger
transaction costs, controlling for fundamental risk. The prediction here
is a cross-sectional one: risk-adjusted expected return must be higher for
less liquid securities. This view, first proposed and tested by Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), has been the basis of a vast empirical literature. Many
subsequent studies of stock-market data have confirmed a significant cross-
sectional association between liquidity (as measured by the tightness of the
bid-ask spread or trading volume) and asset returns, controlling for risk:
among these are Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Chordia, Roll and
Subrahmanyam (2000), and Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998).
Other studies have focussed on liquidity effects in fixed-income security
markets. Here, too, the initiators were Amihud and Mendelson (1991),
who showed that the yield to maturity of treasury notes with six months
or less to maturity exceeds the yield to maturity on the more liquid trea-
sury bills. Studies on U.S. public debt by, e.g., Warga (1992), Daves and
Ehrhardt (1993), Kamara (1994) and Krishnamurthy (2002) confirmed these
findings, although using more recent data Strebulaev (2003) found that the
yield spread between bills and matched notes is much smaller than previ-
ously found, especially when bills are on-the-run. Goldreich, Hanke and
Nath (2002) have refined this line of analysis by investigating the impact of
expected liquidity on securities’ prices. They analyze the prices of Treasury
securities as their liquidity changes predictably, in the transition from on-the-
5
run to the less liquid off-the-run status, and show that the liquidity premium
depends on the expected future liquidity over their remaining lifetime rather
than on their current liquidity.
The “liquidity risk view”, developed in particular by Pastor and Stam-
baugh (2003), highlights that liquidity is priced not only because it creates
trading costs, but also because it is itself a source of risk, since it changes
unpredictably over time. Since investors care about returns net of trad-
ing costs, the variability of trading costs affects the risk of a security. In
an important paper, Acharya and Pedersen (2004) show theoretically in a
CAPM framework with overlapping generations of investors that liquidity
risk should be priced to the extent that it is correlated across assets and
with asset fundamentals, and uncover evidence consistent with this predic-
tion. Similarly, Ellul and Pagano (2006) show that the initial underpricing
of IPO shares should compensate investors also for the expected illiquidity
and for the liquidity risk that investors face in after-market trading, and not
only for fundamental risk and adverse selection problems. Also Gallmeyer,
Hollifield and Seppi (2006) propose a model of liquidity risk where traders
have asymmetric knowledge about future liquidity, so that less informed in-
vestors try to learn from the amount of current trading volume how much
liquidity there may be in the future. They show that current liquidity is a
predictor of future liquidity risk, and therefore is priced.
Our paper puts forward what may be labeled the “risk-liquidity inter-
action view”: we point out that liquidity alters the impact of changes in
risk on current prices and yields. So here the emphasis is not on liquidity
risk (indeed in this approach future liquidity is perfectly anticipated), but
rather on the interaction between liquidity and aggregate risk. In our model,
changes in aggregate risk affect the liquidity premium that assets with lower
transactions costs command. As noted in the introduction, this parallels the
work by Vayanos (2004), who also uses constant exogenous transactions costs
to model illiquidity. Our model has the same prediction as his regarding the
direct effect of transaction costs, but the opposite prediction with respect
to the interaction term, as explained in the previous section: in our setting
higher aggregate risk makes investors less eager to trade away from the ex-
isting portfolio of marketable assets, and therefore reduces liquidity demand
and liquidity premia, while Vayanos (2004) predicts that high volatility am-
plifies the effect of illiquidity and therefore increases liquidity premia.3
3It is useful to emphasize that this effect arises from the interaction of liquidity and the
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On the empirical front, our analysis adds to a growing recent literature on
Euro-area yield differentials. Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) estimate
models of Euro-area differentials with both monthly and daily data. Their
estimates based on monthly data show that for most countries only inter-
national risk factors, and not domestic ones, have explanatory power (the
former being proxied by U.S. bond yield spreads and the latter by national
debt/GDP ratios). In their estimates of daily data (that refer to 2002 only),
macroeconomic variables are not included because they move too slowly to
allow the estimation of the impact of the domestic risk factor. Again, the
international factor is statistically significantly for most countries, while liq-
uidity (as measured by trading volume) is significant only for France, Greece,
the Netherlands and Spain.
Geyer, Kossmeyer and Pichler (2004) estimate with weekly data a multi-
issuer state-space version of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) model of bond
yield spreads (over Germany) for four EMU countries (Austria, Belgium,
Italy, and Spain). They find that idiosyncratic country factors have almost
no explanatory power, and yield-spread data reflect mainly a single (“global”)
factor, whose variation can, to a limited extent, be explained by EMU corpo-
rate bond risk (as measured by the spread of EMU corporate bonds over the
Bund yield), but by nothing else — in particular not by measures of liquidity.
Their measurement of liquidity variables is, however, at best indirect, as they
do not use data on bid-ask spreads, but rather derived measures of liquidity,
such as issue size and the yield differential between on-the-run and off-the-
run bonds. Despite the considerable differences in the methodology and data
used, both, Geyer, Kossmeyer and Pichler (2004) and Codogno, Favero, and
Missale (2003) agree on the finding that yield differentials under EMU are
driven mainly by a common risk (default) factor, related to the spread of
corporate debt over government debt, and suggest that liquidity differences
have at best a minor role in the time-series behavior of yield spreads. As
we shall see, our results, which rely on a more direct measure of liquidity
(daily bid-ask spreads), confirm the former result, but also highlight that the
effect of liquidity cannot be properly gauged without taking into account its
interaction with changes in the common risk factor.
Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2007) complement the MTS data on mar-
ket prices and bid-ask spreads with daily data on credit default swaps for
common risk factor of government bonds. Concerning asset-specific risk, our model does
not deliver more than the standard result that higher default risk increases the yield.
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European sovereign bonds to disentangle empirically the problems of flight
to quality and of flight to liquidity. They show that credit risk and liquidity
are positively correlated across European sovereign issuers and find, consis-
tent with previous studies, that liquidity typically is of minor importance in
explaining yields compared to credit quality. Yet, liquidity becomes an im-
portant determinant of yields in times of high market volatility, measured by
a U.S. index (VIX) or by a European one (VSTOXX). This result contrasts
with our evidence that the liquidity premium on Euro government debt tends
to be lower when aggregate risk is higher. This difference in results may arise
from the fact that Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2006) control for country-
specific risk, but do not consider aggregate risk factors.4 In contrast, we
model risk as being driven by a common factor, consistent with the results
by Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) and Geyer, Kossmeyer, and Pichler
(2004).5
3 Data and Stylized Facts
The data that we use in the empirical analysis concern benchmark bonds’
prices and liquidity indicators for the Euro area, observed at daily frequencies
for the period from 1 January 2002 to 23 December 2003. The data are
collected from the Euro MTS Group’s European Benchmark Market trading
platform, and refer to a snapshot taken at 11 a.m. (Central European Time)
in all market days for the Telematico cash markets. The database contains:
(i) the best five bid and ask prices across all markets, (ii) the aggregate
quantity of all the outstanding proposals made at the best bid and best
ask prices, and (iii) the daily trading volume of each bond on the EBM.
From these data we calculate redemption yields, maturities and a range of
liquidity-related variables described in the Appendix. We consider Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. We do not include Greece and Ireland in the sample, because in
2002 the convergence process to EMU was still ongoing for Greece, while the
Euro MTS data for Ireland become available only at a very late stage of our
sample.
4Other work has investigated the high-frequency impact of credit risk on corporate
bond spreads: see Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Ericsson and Renault (2006).
5Another difference between the two studies lies in the data set, which refers to a largely
non-overlapping different time period, and to a set of securities that is not identical.
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the yield differentials relative to
Germany (for 10-year bonds) and France (for 5-year bonds) and the bid-ask
spreads by country. For 10-year benchmark bonds, average yield differentials
range from 4.16 and 6.94 basis points for France and the Netherlands to 14.47
and 15.50 basis points for Italy and Portugal respectively, while the range of
variation is smaller for 5-year bonds. In both cases, the standard deviation
indicates that yield differentials feature considerable time-series variability.
The statistics reported in the lower panel indicate that bid-ask spreads are
all very tight and stable over time. For 10-year benchmark bonds, average
bid-ask spreads range from 2.52 and 2.86 ticks for Italy and France to 4.60
and 4.87 for Austria and Finland, respectively. German Bunds are the third
most liquid bonds after Italian and French ones in the cash market, with a
spread of 3.25 ticks. The situation is similar for 5-year bonds.
Figure 1 illustrates the time variation of 10 year yield differentials between
each country in our sample and Germany, taken as the reference country. For
clarity, we report separately the data for the Netherlands, France and Aus-
tria in the upper panel, and for all the remaining countries in the lower panel
of the Figure. Yield differentials have a clear tendency to comove. The pres-
ence of comovement is confirmed by Table 2, which reports the correlation
between yield differentials over the sample period and presents a principal-
components analysis. Correlations are very high both within and between
groups, and the principal-components analysis shows that the first principal
component explains above 90 percent of the variance of the series. Liquidity
indicators behave differently. Figure 2 shows the difference in bid-ask spreads
observed for benchmark bonds relative to German ones, for the same group-
ings of countries as those used in Figure 1. The figure reports five-days
moving averages of the daily observations to smooth volatility. Clearly, liq-
uidity indicators have a different time pattern from yield differentials. This
is confirmed by the correlations and principal-components analysis shown in
Table 2. The correlation between differentials in liquidity indicators is much
lower than that between yields differentials. Moreover, the principal- compo-
nents analysis reveals that for liquidity indicators at least six components are
needed to explain the same proportion of the total variance as that explained
by the first component in the case of yield differentials.
The principal-components analysis of Table 2 shows clearly that there is
a common international factor in yield differentials in Europe. In Figure 3
we display the behavior of a variable that is often proposed in the literature
as a proxy for this factor: the spread between the yield on 10-year fixed
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interest rates on swaps and the yield on 10-year U.S. government bonds.
There is ample evidence of a common trend in international bond spreads
(see, for example, Dungey et al.1997). The empirical literature on sovereign
bond spreads in emerging markets shows that the yield of U.S. government
bonds, the slope of the U.S. yield curve and risk indicators on the U.S. bond
markets, are the main determinants of sovereign spreads (see, for example,
Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Barnes and Cline, 1997, and Kamin and Von
Kleist, 1999, Arora and Cerisola, 2001). Blanco (2001) and Codogno et al.
(2003) use proxies for global credit risk derived from the U.S. yield curve in
their models of euro-zone government security yields. Consistent with these
findings and with the results of Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004), Figure
3 shows that this international risk factor is strongly correlated with the first
principal component of yield differentials in the Euro area.
4 Theoretical Framework
We consider a partial-equilibrium model with three dates t = 0, 1, 2. There
are two traded bonds, denoted by A and B, and a riskless asset that yields
a net return of r per period. Bond i = A,B pays its face value V with
probability qi and 0 with probability 1− qi at date 2 and nothing at date 1.
Without loss of generality we assume that qB ≤ qA and interpret bond A as
the benchmark. The repayment probabilities of the two bonds are driven by
a common factor α. When this factor increases, both bonds are less likely to
repay: dqi/dα ≤ 0.6 The purchase price of bond i at date 0 is p0i. The bonds
can be re-traded at date 1 at a bid price of (1− ti)p1i, and ask price of p1i,
where ti is a proportional transactions cost.
A continuum of investors h ∈ [0, 1] are ready to invest at date 0 in order
to consume at date 2. Investors are risk neutral and maximize date-2 con-
sumption. Investors may want to liquidate their bonds at date 1 to invest
in alternative investment opportunities, which comprises non-marketable pri-
vate equity and human capital. The expected return of these real investments
is negatively affected by aggregate factor α:
r − ehα,
6Note that since we work in a risk-neutral setting, there is no need to specify the
variance-covariance structure of bond returns. We describe such an extension for the case
of risk-averse investors in the appendix.
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where r > 0 is the maximal expected return and eh ∈ [0, e], is a person-
specific parameter that captures investor h’s exposure to the aggregate fac-
tor. In our risk-neutral setting, the aggregate factor can be anything that
depresses the profitability of real investment opportunities as well as reducing
the solvency of marketable debt, such as the likelihood or severity of macroe-
conomic downturns. Accordingly, the individual factor eh can be thought as
the sensitivity of a person’s private investment opportunities to this common
factor, as determined for instance by the sector of her family firm. In a model
with risk-averse investors and risky investments, the common factor α would
instead capture aggregate risk, while the individual factor eh would measure
the investor’s exposure to it. We sketch such an extension of the model in
the appendix.
The assumption that the common factor α affects both the returns to
marketable assets (in our case, the occurrence of default) and those to non-
marketable investments accords with a substantial body of evidence that
finds a strong positive correlation between them, starting with the seminal
paper on private equity returns by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
In our empirical analysis, we will proxy the factor α by the difference between
the U.S. corporate swap rate and the treasury yield, a measure typically
used to describe aggregate corporate risk (although it also captures other
macroeconomic factors).
As the investor’s exposure to the aggregate factor, eh, increases over its
support, the expected return of h’s investment opportunity falls. We assume
that eh satisfies the law of large numbers, so that uncertainty washes out in
the aggregate and individual probabilities are the same as aggregate frequen-
cies. Let us denote by G the differentiable cumulative distribution function
of eh and by g = G´ its density function.
At date 1, an investor will liquidate his holdings of bond i to invest
in his outside investment opportunity if and only if the latter’s expected
return exceeds the expected return of the bond over its residual life, net of
transactions costs:
r − ehα > qiV
(1− ti)p1i
. (1)
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Hence, investor h will sell his holdings of bond i with ex-ante probability
πi = prob
µ
eh <
r
α
− qiV
α(1− ti)p1i
¶
(2)
= G
µ
r
α
− qiV
α(1− ti)p1i
¶
. (3)
Note that here investors liquidate their assets as a function of changing in-
vestment opportunities, and therefore as a function of market prices and
yields. In other words, in this model demand for liquidity is price-elastic.
At the interim date, investors will buy bond i only if (1) does not hold
and if the bond does not yield less than the safe investment, i.e. if its price
is sufficiently low:
p1i ≤
qiV
1 + r
≡ vi. (4)
Hence, p1i = vi is the maximum possible price for an equilibrium at
date 1 to exist. Necessary for the existence of an equilibrium is therefore
that aggregate demand for liquidity at this price is positive, i.e. that r
is sufficiently large. If r were too small, even the investors with the most
profitable investment opportunity would value them less than their bond
holdings and no investor would ever want to sell bonds at date 1.
No-arbitrage implies that the expected yields of all assets are equalized
in equilibrium. Hence (4) must hold with equality,7 implying:
p1i = vi, i = A,B, (5)
πi = G
µ
r
α
− 1 + r
α(1− ti)
¶
. (6)
In particular, the discount rate between dates 1 and 2 is r, the same as
between 0 and 1. The expected payoff of bond i at date 0 therefore is
p0i = πi
(1− ti)p1i
1 + r
+ (1− πi)
qiV
(1 + r)2
=
(1− πiti)qiV
(1 + r)2
,
because investors have rational expectations over their future decision to
either sell (which occurs with probability πi) or hold on to the bond (which
7In a closed economy with no short-selling allowed there could be an equilibrium in
which (4) holds with strict inequality. Clearly, this is of no interest in our setting.
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occurs with probability 1− πi). So the bond’s pledged yield to maturity is
1 + Yi =
V
p0i
=
(1 + r)2
(1− πiti)qi
The yield ratio between the two bonds is simpler to calculate than the yield
differential. It is given by
1 + YB
1 + YA
=
1− πAtA
1− πBtB
· qA
qB
.
By using the approximation ln(1+x) ≈ x the yield differential at date 0 can
be approximated simply by:
∆Y = YB − YA ≈ πBtB − qB − πAtA + qA. (7)
This expression for the yield differential is intuitive. First, there is a
direct positive impact of transactions costs. If πi were constant, that is,
the probability of liquidation were not endogenously chosen by investors,
then transaction costs would, as usual, drive up yields. Equivalently, greater
bond liquidity would be associated with lower required yields. This is clear
from (7): if πi is constant and the cost tB of trading bond B increases, its
yield increases relative to that of bond A. The reason is that the buyer
of the asset anticipates trading costs that must be compensated. As these
costs only materialize if the holder trades at date 1, tB is weighed with the
probability of this event, which is πB.
The second feature of (7) is that the yield differential increases in funda-
mental risk: the higher the risk of default of, say, bond B, which is 1− qB,
the higher its required yield compared to bond A. Given the absence of
risk aversion in our model, this is not a risk premium but simply reflects
the reduction in the discounted expected payoff of the bond. The impact of
fundamental risk and of liquidity costs on yield spreads in (7) is standard
and in line, for example, with the empirical findings of Beber, Brandt, and
Karavacz (2006) for Euro government bonds.
However, the response of bond yields to changes in liquidity and risk
become more interesting once one takes into account that the probability
of liquidation is endogenous in this model. This probability itself reacts
to changes in both transaction costs (the terms at which the “supply of
liquidity” is available) and outside investment opportunities (that determine
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the “demand for liquidity” by market participants). Indeed, as we shall see,
it also depends non-trivially on the interaction between the two.
As one would expect, both higher transaction costs (higher ti) and less at-
tractive aggregate investment opportunities (higher α) reduce a given bond’s
probability of liquidation (πi):
∂πi
∂ti
= − 1 + r
α(1− ti)2
g
µ
r
α
− 1 + r
α(1− ti)
¶
< 0, (8)
∂πi
∂α
= − 1
α2
(r − 1 + r
1− ti
)g
µ
r
α
− 1 + r
α(1− ti)
¶
< 0. (9)
Intuitively, if transactions costs increase, i.e. the bond becomes less liquid,
then liquidating it becomes less attractive, hence the probability of selling
decreases. Similarly, if the aggregate risk factor increases, the investors’ mar-
ket investment opportunities become less attractive, which again decreases
their probability of selling the bond.8
Equipped with these results, we can now explore how risk and liquidity
affect bond yields in our simple model. For simplicity, we perform the com-
parative statics of the yield differential (7) with respect to tB only (the effect
of tA is analogous):
∂∆Y
∂tB
= πB +
∂πB
∂tB
tB, (10)
∂∆Y
∂α
=
∂πB
∂α
tB −
∂πA
∂α
tA +
∂(qB − qA)
∂α
, (11)
∂2∆Y
∂tB∂α
=
∂πB
∂α
+
∂2πB
∂tB∂α
tB. (12)
The first term in (10) is positive, the second negative. Hence, the sign is a
priori ambiguous. This ambiguity reflects two opposing effects — a direct and
an indirect one. The direct effect of higher transactions costs is to drive up
the price by a factor πB: with exogenous liquidation probability, this would
8We do not report the joint effect of an increase in transaction costs and in aggregate
risk, ∂2πi/∂ti∂α. In our model, this cross-derivative cannot be signed unambiguously, but
is positive for several examples of distributions G, including the uniform distribution. If
it is positive, an increase in transactions costs (i.e. a decrease in liquidity) reduces the
absolute value of the impact of the aggregate factor on trading volume πi, hence, there is
a flight to liquidity. Yet, as we shall see, this term will be of second order in the derivation
of the relevant derivatives for yield spreads and can be neglected in a first approximation.
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be the only effect, as observed above in discussing (7). But when liquidation
is endogenously determined, this effect is at least partly counteracted by a
reduction of the trading probability, as described in (8). As this probability
decreases, the relative price of the bond increases, because liquidation costs
are incurred less often. Hence, this effect is proportional to tB. To the extent
that empirically bid-ask spreads in the bond market are very small (see Table
1), we expect the latter effect to be small in absolute terms and the overall
effect to be positive.
The impact of risk on yield differentials in (11) has first two terms of
small size and opposite sign, so that one would expect its overall sign to
depend mainly on the sign of the third term ∂(qA− qB)/∂α, which measures
the impact of aggregate risk on the fundamental risk of the two bonds. Two
possibilities exist in principle. First, the effect of aggregate risk is similar
for both bonds, in which case the term is approximately zero. Alternatively,
the riskier bond is more sensitive to aggregate risk than the safer one, in
which case we have ∂(qA− qB)/∂α > 0. In this case, we have the well-known
“flight to quality”: an increase in aggregate risk makes the safer bond more
attractive than the riskier one and hence drives up the yield differential. This
is the typical effect stressed by practitioners. Our empirical strategy is to let
the data tell us the sign of the derivative. In the appendix, we show how the
positive sign arises in a simple model of imperfect but constant correlation
of bond returns.
Finally, the joint effect of changes in risk and in liquidity is again ambigu-
ous, but has one dominant element. As seen above, while the direct effect
of aggregate risk on the probability of liquidation — the first term in (12) —
is always negative, the second term is ambiguous. This second term is the
product of the flight to liquidity in terms of order flow and the transactions
cost tB. Since tB is small, we expect the negative first term to dominate.
We summarize the previous discussion in the following testable predic-
tions regarding the effects of risk and illiquidity on the yield differential,
where, recalling that changes in tB are mirror images of those in tA, we
measure illiquidity by the transaction cost differential ∆t:
Hypothesis 1. The yield differential is insensitive to aggregate risk if ag-
gregate risk affects bonds of different fundamental value identically. It is
increasing in aggregate risk if the fundamentals of riskier bonds react more
to aggregate risk than those of less risky ones:
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∂∆Y
∂α
≥ 0. (13)
Hypothesis 2. The yield differential between the two bonds depends posi-
tively on their transactions cost differential:
∂∆Y
∂∆t > 0. (14)
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of transactions costs on the yield differ-
ential is dampened by aggregate risk:
∂2∆Y
∂∆t∂α < 0. (15)
While the first two predictions are in line with those of other existing
models of asset pricing and liquidity, the third prediction is specific to our
model. If, for example, bond trades are driven by consumption or endowment
shocks, as in the OLG model of Acharya and Pedersen (2004) or the theo-
retical liquidity literature building on Diamond-Dybvig (1983), then the πi
would be constant and, from (7), yield differentials would only depend on liq-
uidity and aggregate risk directly. The cross-effect identified in (15) would be
zero in this case. If bond sales were triggered by changes in consumption op-
portunities or other “supply side” considerations as in the delegated-portfolio
management model of Vayanos (2004), rather than from changes in the risk-
return profile of alternative investments, the πi would depend positively on
α rather than negatively, as in our model, and the cross-effect (15) would be
positive. Then aggregate risk would amplify rather than dampen liquidity
effects.
5 Empirical Evidence
The empirical strategy used to test the predictions of Section 4 is based on
the estimation of a simultaneous equation model for yield differentials in the
Euro area at different maturities.
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We measure the aggregate risk factor by the spread between j-year fixed
interest rates on U.S. swaps, RjSWUS,t, and the yield on j-year U.S. govern-
ment bonds, RjUS,t. We opt for this measure because of its high correlation
with all U.S.-based measures of risk and because of its availability at different
maturities. In the next section we report estimates obtained using alterna-
tive measures of risk and show that our results are robust to the choice of
risk measure. The robustness of our estimates to different proxies for risk
is important, since the swap-treasury differential could arguably reflect the
taking on and unwinding of carry trades in the market: these trades (which
are generally trades with a U.S. dollar leg) may explain why factors based on
U.S. interest rates become international risk factors. While in principle this
argument does not make this differential less suitable as a proxy for aggregate
risk in the Euro area, it raises the doubt that our proxy itself may be affected
by liquidity. But our robustness analysis indicates that this is unlikely; the
strong and positive comovements of all the measures of risk at different ma-
turities make it difficult to interpret them as affected by carry trades, which
should have different effects on prices at different maturities. As for the liq-
uidity factor, we considered a range of alternative liquidity indicators and
select the bid-ask spread as the most significant measure.
In taking the model to the data, we take the following specification strat-
egy. First, we choose German bonds as benchmarks for the ten-year maturity
and French bonds for the five-year maturity. This choice is supported by the
econometric evidence provided by Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) and by
the fact that traders commonly regard the 10-year Bunds as the 10-year
Euro-area benchmark and French OATs as the 5-year Euro-area benchmark,
because French bonds are seen as particularly liquid for the 5-year maturity
bucket.
Second, as yield spreads in the euro area are very persistent and our
predictions are derived within a static framework, we posit the following
dynamic partial adjustment model for yield differentials:
Yi,t − Yb,t = ρi (Yi,t−1 − Yb,t−1) + (1− ρi) (Yi,t − Yb,t)
∗ + ui,t,
where ui,t are independently identically distributed shocks and (Yi,t−Yb,t)∗ is
the theory-consistent long-run equilibrium value for yield differentials. Third,
we augment the specification with the differentials in the residual maturity
of the benchmark bonds in country i and the benchmark country, in order to
filter out of the data the effect introduced by the different maturity of bench-
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mark bonds and the effect of changes in benchmarks occurring at different
dates for different countries in the sample period.9
5.1 The Baseline Model
To sum up, we estimate as a baseline model the following eight-equation
model, where the dependent variables are the yield differentials relative to a
benchmark government bond for the other eight countries listed in Section
3:
Y ji,t − Y
j
b,t = ρi
¡
Y ji,t−1 − Y
j
b,t−1
¢
+ (1− ρi)
¡
Y ji,t − Y
j
b,t
¢∗
+
+δi
¡
M ,ji,t −M
j
b,t
¢
+ ui,t,¡
Y ji,t − Y
j
b,t
¢∗
= β1,i
¡
cji,t − c
j
b,t
¢
+ β2,i
¡
RjSWUS,t −R
j
US,t
¢
−β3,i
¡
cji,t − c
j
b,t
¢ ¡
RjSWUS,t −R
j
US,t
¢
,
where
¡
Y ji,t − Y
j
b,t
¢∗
is the long-run equilibrium yield differential consistent
with the theory, M ,ji,t −M
j
b,t are differentials in the residual maturity of the
benchmark bonds in country i and the benchmark country, RjSWUS,t −R
j
US,t
is the spread between j-year fixed interest rates on U.S. swaps, RjSWUS,t,
and the yield on j-year U.S. government bonds, RjUS,t, and c
j
i,t − c
j
b,t is the
differential between the bid-ask spread of bonds in country i and the bid-
ask spread of bonds in the benchmark country. The index i varies across
countries and the index j varies across maturities (five and ten years). The
estimation is performed by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), and the
empirical results are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
The estimates for the 10-year maturity yield differential are presented in
Table 4.1. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is always signifi-
cant and close to unity, which indicates strong persistence of yield differen-
tials. Also the coefficient of the maturity differential variable is uniformly
9We also tried different methods of dealing with these problems such as omitting from
the sample dates in which benchmarks are changed or constructing constant maturity
yields. We favour the use of the maturity differentials in that it is a natural way of
correcting the differentials and it allows our liquidity indicator to operate during episodes
in which liquidity might highly matter, such as at dates when benchmarks are changed.
An alternative to the maturity differential is the duration differential. However, the
difference between these two measures is not very relevant in our case given that they
both act as dummies to model the same jump in duration and maturity occurring in
occasion of benchmark changes.
18
positive and significant, confirming the importance of this correction. The
corresponding results for the 5-year maturity are shown in Table 4.2. Again,
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant,
but it is smaller for all eight countries, indicating lower persistence in the
time-series behavior of 5-year yield differentials. Also the maturity correc-
tion coefficient stays positive and significant for all eight countries.
More importantly, the coefficient of the aggregate risk factor is positive
and significantly different from zero for all eight countries in both maturities,
in accordance with Hypothesis 1 of Section 4. It ranges between 0.3 and
0.6. for the 10-year bonds and between 0.23 and 0.68 for the 5-year bonds
(except in the latter case for Germany, where the coefficient is virtually zero).
Interpreting these positive coefficients from the perspective of the theory
summarized in Hypothesis 1 leads us to conclude that the fundamental risk
of non-benchmark bonds is perceived to be more strongly affected by changes
in aggregate risk than that of benchmark bonds. So, higher aggregate risk
— as proxied by our U.S. swap yield differential — is correlated with wider
Euro-area yield differentials relative to the Bund (or respectively the OAT).
Turning to the liquidity variable, we note that at the 5-year maturity the
coefficients of the liquidity variables are positive and significant in the case
of Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal, in line with
Hypothesis 2 of Section 4.
Finally, in line with Hypothesis 3, the interaction between liquidity and
the aggregate risk factor has always a negative impact on the yield differ-
entials. This finding is substantially confirmed at the 10-year maturity, al-
though the results are weakened in the case of Spain and Italy. This evidence
illustrates the importance of non-linearities in the effect of liquidity indicators
on yield differentials. Interestingly, the coefficient of the liquidity differen-
tial variable becomes significant only when the interaction between liquidity
indicators and the aggregate risk factor is also included in the regression. If
the coefficient of the interaction is constrained to zero, then also the level of
the liquidity indicator becomes insignificant.
This evidence does not simply reflect the fact that for less liquid bonds
prices take more time to absorb the change in risks. In fact, we control for dif-
ferent dynamic effects across countries of the variables included in our model
by having potentially different coefficients on the lagged dependent variable.
Moreover a simple check, effected by adding further lags of the included
variables, delivers non-significant parameters for higher order dynamics.
It could be observed that our SUR estimation is inefficient when valid
19
cross-equation restrictions can be imposed on our model. This argument is
strengthened in the context of our theoretical model where the cross-equation
restrictions on the coefficients on the measure of liquidity and on the inter-
action between the aggregate risk factor and this measure are indeed implied
by theory.
In Table 5, we explore this possibility by imposing cross-equation restric-
tions on our estimated models for 5-year and 10-year differentials. We test for
the validity of cross-equation restrictions on each coefficient separately and
on the full set of coefficients. Interestingly, the Wald statistics reported in
Table 5 illustrate that the panel restrictions can only be validly imposed on
the liquidity indicators at the 10-year maturity. When these restrictions are
imposed, the effect of the liquidity variables is significant and in line with the
prediction of the theory. Yet, this result does not carry over to the 5-year
maturity, where the panel restrictions cannot be imposed on the liquidity
variables. Furthermore, the panel restrictions on the coefficient of the aggre-
gate risk factor are always rejected, in line with the predictions of the model
where the impact of international risk on fundamental risk is heterogenous
across different bonds.
Summing up, our empirical results are generally supportive of the impli-
cations of our theoretical framework: in particular, the aggregate risk factor
always has a positive and significant effect on yields, and there is an impor-
tant negative interaction between liquidity and the international factor.
5.2 Robustness
Swap spreads can be considered a good measure of risk, for a number of
reasons. First, they are effectively the difference between the yields to matu-
rity of two bonds with the same maturity. By no arbitrage, long-term yields
to maturity can be exactly decomposed in a component reflecting the dis-
counted sum of future one-period bond yields and in a component reflecting
term premia. Taking the difference between two yields of exactly the same
maturity, we are left with a quantity that exclusively reflects term premia.10
Second, they are available at the different maturities relevant to our study,
thus enabling us to account for a non-flat term structure of risk premia.
Third, U.S. swap spreads provide a measure of risk that does not refer to the
10Note that spreads can still depend on the level of interest rates, but only to the extent
that the level of interest rates is differently reflected in the term premia associated to the
two bonds on which yield differentials are computed.
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European market, and therefore are much more likely to be an exogenous
variable in the estimation of the parameters of interest than any measure
based on European yields. Fourth, as a spread between homogenous types of
bonds, they are a superior measure of risk compared to the spread between
Treasury bonds and corporate bonds.11
However, it must be recognized that swap spreads are a special measure
of risk, in that they include the counterparty risk of swap dealers,12 and
occasionally might reflect factors that are not related to aggregate risk. A
close examination of Figure 3 reveals that the positive and strong comove-
ment between the first principal component of yield differentials in the Euro
area and our measure of risk has a clear exception in late July 2003. At this
date, swap spreads suddenly increased for reasons related to the hedging of
mortgage-backed securities and hence little related to international factors.
It is therefore important to assess the robustness of our results.
We provide the relevant evidence in Table 6, where we report the results
of re-estimating our model for the 10-year yields differentials on a shorter
sample, which excludes the July 2003 episode. The table also reports the ev-
idence obtained by augmenting the baseline regression with two alternative
measures of risk. The first is the yield spread between BBB long-term corpo-
rate bonds and AAA long-term corporate bonds; the second is an indicator
based on the European equity market: the implied volatility from options on
the Eurostoxx 50. The results show that our estimates are robust both to
the choice of the sample size and to the use of different measures of risk. In
particular, the results on the shorter sample fully confirm the evidence from
our full sample with some slight modification of the original point estimates.
Augmentation of the model with alternative measures of risk shows that, al-
though all alternative measures of risk are significant, their inclusion does not
affect the significance of all variables included in the original model. Over-
all, the significance of risk factors is more robust than that of the liquidity
factor and of the interaction term. We perform similar robustness checks for
the 5-year differentials, but for brevity we do not report the corresponding
results, which confirm those obtained for the 10-year spreads.
11Duffee (1998) notes that the spread between Treasury bonds and corporate bonds is
a spread between callable bonds and a mixture of callable and non-callable bonds. Given
that the response of callable and non-callable bonds to shocks in the level of the term
structure is different, the government-corporate spread is sensitive to the level of the term
structure.
12Although, in practice this effect is minimal: see, for example, Duffie and Huang (1996).
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In the case of the 5-year bonds we also re-estimate the model with the
German Bund as a benchmark instead of the French OAT. This modification
leads to much less precise estimates of all relevant parameters and to a set of
results that are much less consistent with those obtained for the 10-year dif-
ferentials. We take this as confirmatory evidence of the econometric analysis
by Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) that indicates the OAT as the preferred
choice of benchmark for the 5-year maturity.
Having chosen a U.S.-based measure of aggregate risk, a final robustness
check concerns the inclusion of the dollar-euro exchange rate as an indepen-
dent source of risk: in all specifications, this variable is insignificant.
6 Conclusions
This paper explores the determinants of observed yield differentials between
sovereign bonds. It does so by drawing on data for long-tern bond yields in
the Euro area. Inspection of daily data for the early EMU period indicates
that there is a strong comovement in yield differentials of benchmark bonds,
and that their first principal components explains more than ninety per cent
of the variance. This common trend appears highly correlated with measures
of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity differentials — proxied, for example, by
bid-ask spread differentials — feature sizeable heterogeneity and no common
factor.
To generate testable predictions about the relation between yield differ-
entials, fundamental risk, and liquidity, we develop a simple model of the
interplay between aggregate risk and transactions costs. Our model has two
key novel features. First, the demand for liquidity responds to the magnitude
of transaction costs and to changes in investors’ opportunity set (rather than
being determined by exogenous liquidation needs). Specifically, investors
value liquidity less when alternative investment opportunities become less
attractive. Second, if the payoff of alternative investments covaries with that
of marketable assets, being both driven by a common factor, the equilibrium
value of liquidity tends to be lower in worse aggregate states, as determined
by this common factor.
The model predicts that bond yield differentials should increase in both
liquidity and aggregate risk, with a non-linear term that captures the effect
on required bond returns due to the interaction between liquidity and the
aggregate factor. We test these predictions on daily data for the Euro-area
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sovereign yield differentials in 2002 and 2003. The econometric results show
that the aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, while liquidity differen-
tials are priced only for a subset of nine country/maturity pairs (out of a
total of sixteen), and that the interaction of liquidity differentials with the
risk factor is always negative when significant, in line with the prediction of
the model. Our findings are also consistent with those of recent papers that
find that the effect of liquidity variables on bond returns is not economically
important when considered in isolation. In fact, when the coefficient of the
interaction term between aggregate risk and liquidity is constrained to be
zero, liquidity becomes insignificant throughout our regressions.
Our data do not allow us to draw conclusions regarding the effect of
cross-sectional differences in macroeconomic conditions or fiscal policies. For
example, simple cross-country regressions show that on average over the sam-
ple period, (average) yield spreads are positively correlated with (average)
government debt/GDP ratios, which in turn are negatively correlated with
(average) bid-ask spreads. But, being based on nine data points only, these
cross-sectional estimates have little reliability, and in our time-series analy-
sis we do not have sufficient variation in macroeconomic variables (such as
debt/GDP ratios) to draw conclusions about possible macroeconomic deter-
minants of the variables that we observe.
The implications of our analysis for policy-makers and for portfolio man-
agers are rather more subtle. From a policy-making standpoint, the empirical
estimates highlight the importance of the aggregate risk factor in determining
bond yield spreads, and thus underscore the importance of good macroeco-
nomic fundamentals to minimize exposure to the aggregate risk factor. In-
stead, there seems to be little need for further action on the liquidity side,
because bid-ask spreads are already rather uniform and very small across
European bond markets, at least for benchmark bonds. Instead, the lesson
for portfolio management is that liquidity can affect the risk sensitivity of
the assets being held, and that this interaction depends on the covariance of
illiquidity costs with aggregate risk. In this sense, the lesson of our model —
in spite of its simplicity — may be considerably more general than our specific
application to Euro-area bond markets.
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Appendix 1: Extension to Risky Portfolios
In this appendix, we sketch an extension of the model in which the in-
vestors’ investment opportunities are risky and imperfectly correlated. As
in the main text of the paper, the two bonds can either repay (eVi = V ) or
default (eVi = 0). The probabilities are
(eVA, eVB) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(V, V ) with probability γ + α,
(V, 0) with probability pV 0,
(0, V ) with probability 1− α− γ − pV 0,
(0, 0) with probability α.
It is straightforward to show that the correlation between the two returns
is
ρ =
(α+ γ + pV 0)(pV 0 + α)− pV 0p
(α+ γ + pV 0)(1− α− γ − pV 0)(pV 0 + α)(1− pV 0 − α)
.
Holding the correlation constant, for small values of α (which is the rel-
evant case), an increase in α increases the variance of both bonds, hence α
can be viewed as an indicator of aggregate risk. If we hold ρ constant, this
structure has two free parameters, namely the aggregate factor α and the
relative attractiveness of bond A, which can be measured by γ.
The assumption qA ≥ qB (bond A is the benchmark) implies that α +
γ + 2pV 0 ≥ 1. Under this assumption, for ρ constant, it is straightforward
(though tedious) to calculate that ∂∂α(qA − qB) ≥ 0 for small values of α, as
postulated in Section 4.
The alternative investment opportunity of investor h pays off as follows:
eRh =
⎧
⎨
⎩
r −
√
eh with probability α
r with probability s
r +
√
eh with probability α
where s > 0, s + 2α = 1, 0 ≤ eh ≤ e. For each h we have E eRh = r and
var( eRh) = 2αeh. Hence, higher α means higher risk, and the investor bears
more of the risk the greater her eh. If she is risk-averse, she will therefore
behave as if she maximized the certainty equivalent r−αeh considered in the
main text.
If risk-averse, the investor’s objective is to maximize Eu(c), where u is
increasing and concave,
c = xAeVA + xB eVB + xC(1 + r) + xR eRh
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is final consumption, and the xi are the investor’s end-of-period-1 holdings
of the four assets.
Because of transactions costs, the first-order condition of this problem
depends on whether the investor buys or sells in equilibrium. As an exam-
ple, consider the case where the investor sells both bonds in order to invest
alternatively. In this case, her first-order conditions are
E(eVA − (1 + r)(1− tA)p1A)u0(c) = 0,
E(eVB − (1 + r)(1− tB)p1B)u0(c) = 0,
E( eRh − (1 + r))u0(c) = 0.
Hence,
(1− ti)p1iE[ eRhu0(c)] = E[eViu0(c)], i = A,B
⇔ cov(
eVi
p1i
− (1− ti) eRh, u0(c)) = µV ip1i − (1− ti)r
¶
Eu0(c)
This condition on how the the excess return of each bond over the investor’s
(transactions costs adjusted) alternative return must covary with marginal
utility is a standard CAPM-type condition, with the new feature that the
alternative return is investor-specific. This “investor-specific β” gives rise to
a supply curve of bonds that is increasing in p1i, i = A,B, and decreasing in
aggregate risk α, as used in the main text.
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Appendix 2: Data Description
The data for 5-year and 10-year-maturity bonds from 1 January 2002 to
23 December 2003 are collected from Euro MTS Group’s European Bench-
mark Market (EBM) trading platform, at 11 a.m. CET during all market
days in the Telematico cash markets. The database contains the best bid or
ask prices across all markets, the aggregate quantity of all of the outstanding
proposals on basis of the best bid and best ask prices, and the daily trading
volume of each bond on the EBM. From these data we calculate redemp-
tion yields, maturities and a set of time-varying liquidity variables for the
benchmark bonds of each country in our sample. The countries are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. We constructed the following liquidity variables (in all cases as the
difference between the relevant country’s value and the value observed for
the benchmark, which was Germany for the 10-year bucket and France for
the 5-year one):
• 5-day-moving-average of the bid-ask spread (in ticks);
• trading volume for the benchmark bond, in million of Euros;
• bid-side market depth, defined as the difference between bid and mid
price, divided by the bid quantity;
• ask-side market depth, defined as the difference between mid price and
ask price, divided by the ask quantity;
• maximum quantity available at the best 5 prices.
After experimentation, we selected the bid-ask spread as the most signif-
icant liquidity indicator, and reported the estimates of our non-linear empir-
ical model only for this liquidity indicator.13
13This is confirmed for example by Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2006), who find no
significant difference in the impacts of the four liquidity variables they construct from the
MTS data base.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics by Country
Panel A. Euro-area yield differentials relative to Germany, 10 year maturity
(resp. France, 5 year maturity), in basis points
10-year benchmark bonds 5-year benchmark bonds
Country Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev.
Austria 10.05 9.46 7.19 3.35 0.74 9.22
France 4.16 5.62 4.36 3.57 2.37 4.70
Netherlands 6.94 6.92 4.48 6.07 5.60 6.87
Belgium 13.45 11.79 6.80 4.78 4.40 8.09
Spain 9.72 8.06 7.44 -2.16 -0.42 10.13
Finland 10.88 9.34 8.30 6.48 582 11.18
Italy 14.47 15.70 4.88 7.97 8.34 8.01
Portugal 15.50 14.48 7.73 6.46 12.03 16.76
Panel B. Bid-ask spreads in ticks
10-year benchmark bonds 5-year benchmark bonds
Country Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev.
Austria 4.60 4.4 1.10 4.11 4.00 0.64
France 2.86 2.80 0.46 2.52 2.60 0.34
Netherlands 3.55 3.60 0.50 3.75 3.80 0.45
Belgium 3.47 3.40 0.53 2.71 2.60 0.31
Spain 3.47 3.20 0.80 2.94 2.60 0.78
Finland 4.87 4.60 1.09 4.07 3.80 0.81
Italy 2.52 2.40 1.37 2.12 2.00 0.43
Portugal 4.33 4.40 0.69 3.16 3.00 0.51
Germany 3.25 3.00 0.67 3.20 3.20 0.45
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TABLE 2
Correlation and Principal Components of Euro-Area Yield
Differentials, 10 Year Bonds, Relative to Germany
Panel A. Correlation matrix
Country AT FR NL BE ES FI IT PT
Austria 1 - - - - - - -
France 0.65 1 - - - - - -
Netherlands 0.51 0.48 1 - - - - -
Belgium 0.88 0.72 0.61 1 - - - -
Spain 0.88 0.67 0.58 0.94 1 - - -
Finland 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.93 0.90 1 - -
Italy 0.75 0.84 0.52 0.82 0.80 0.89 1 -
Portugal 0.92 0.69 0.61 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.78 1
Panel B. Principal components
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Eigenvalue 7.28 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01
Proportion of variance 0.91 0.03 0.02 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.001
Cumulative proportion 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.988 0.99 0.998 1
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TABLE 3
Correlation and Principal Components of Euro-Area Bid-Ask
Spread Differentials Relative to Germany
Panel A. Correlation matrix
Country AT FR NL BE ES FI IT PT
Austria 1.00 - - - - - - -
France 0.22 1.00 - - - - - -
Netherlands 0.49 0.51 1.00 - - - - -
Belgium 0.39 0.46 0.44 1.00 - - - -
Spain 0.58 0.26 0.60 0.35 1.00 - — -
Finland 0.48 0.21 0.54 0.26 0.76 1.00 — -
Italy 0.09 0.37 0.19 0.26 -0.08 -0.11 1.00 -
Portugal 0.22 0.50 0.29 0.56 0.20 0.19 0.24 1.00
Panel B. Principal components
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Eigenvalue 3.46 1.76 0.80 0.61 0.48 0.38 0.29 0.19
Proportion of variance 0.43 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
Cumulative proportion 0.43 0.65 0.75 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.97 1
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TABLE 4.1
Estimation of a System of Simultaneous Equations for Euro-Area
10-Year Yield Differentials
The equations are estimated by SURE, on a sample of daily observations from 1/1/2002 to 23/12/2003.
The Panel shows the coefficient estimates for the 10-year maturity, spreads are on German bonds. Standard
errors are reported within brackets below the coefficient estimates. An asterisk (*) and a cross (†)
indicate that the corresponding coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively.
Variable Constant Own lag Maturity Risk factor B-A spread Interaction
Austria -0.167* 0.857* 0.280* 0.546* 0.043* -0.077*
(0.026) (0.016) (0.034) (0.060) (0.014) (0.026)
Belgium -0.129* 0.936* 0.357* 0.497* 0.052* -0.099*
(0.021) (0.007) (0.040) (0.043) (0.022) (0.048)
Spain -0.135* 0.867* 0.349* 0.485* 0.007 -0.009
(0.034) (0.018) (0.061) (0.077) (0.024) (0.047)
Finland -0.159* 0.956* 0.207* 0.467* -0.01 -0.025
(0.049) (0.006) (0.045) (0.118) (0.024) (0.079)
France -0.119* 0.945* 0.184* 0.321* 0.016 -0.025
(0.038) (0.01) (0.077) (0.072) (0.038) (0.079)
Italy -0.077* 0.912* 0.288* 0.290* 0.017 -0.042
(0.021) (0.01) (0.037) (0.047) (0.018) (0.043)
Netherlands -0.076* 0.891* 0.314* 0.305* 0.034* -0.052†
(0.019) (0.012) (0.029) (0.042) (0.016) (0.032)
Portugal -0.150* 0.920* 0.384* 0.633* 0.080* -0.139*
(0.044) (0.010) (0.052) (0.099) (0.033) (0.07)
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TABLE 4.2
Estimation of a System of Simultaneous Equations for Euro-Area
5-Year Yield Differentials
The equations are estimated by SURE, on a sample of daily observations from 1/1/2002 to 23/12/2003.
The Panel shows coefficients estimates results for the 5-year maturity, spreads are on French Bonds.
Standard errors are reported within brackets below the coefficient estimates. An asterisk (*) and a cross
(†) indicate that the corresponding coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively.
Variable Constant Own lag Maturity Risk factor B-A spread Interaction
Austria -0.251* 0.833* 0.170* 0.679* 0.079* -0.184*
(0.039) (0.017) (0.011) (0.09) (0.023) (0.048)
Belgium -0.082* 0.774* 0.214* 0.297* -0.022 -0.033
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.034) (0.018) (0.042)
Spain -0.143* 0.693* 0.210* 0.337* 0.048* -0.095*
(0.013) (0.021) (0.007) (0.03) (0.020) (0.041)
Finland -0.106* 0.606* 0.205* 0.258* -0.018 -0.025
(0.017) (0.022) (0.005) (0.041) (0.012) (0.024)
Germany -0.017 0.742* 0.168* 0.01 -0.007 0.004
(0.015) (0.018) (0.007) (0.03) (0.012) (0.026)
Italy -0.043* 0.584* 0.172* 0.231* 0.107* -0.208*
(0.016) (0.03) (0.006) (0.028) (0.017) (0.032)
Netherlands -0.123* 0.563* 0.191* 0.317* 0.017* -0.045∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.04) (0.036) (0.009) (0.020)
Portugal -0.122* 0.853* 0.240* 0.458* 0.052* -0.125*
(0.022) (0.010) (0.006) (0.05) (0.018) (0.04)
34
TABLE 5
Testing Panel Restrictions
The table is based on a fixed-effects panel estimates for the 10-year and 5-year yield differentials. The
p-value of the Wald test of the identity restriction of individual coefficients for all eight countries is shown
on the right of the relevant coefficient. The p-value of the Wald test of the identity restriction of all
the coefficients for all eight countries is shown in the bottom row. Standard errors are reported within
brackets below the coefficient estimates. An asterisk (*) and a cross (†) indicate that the corresponding
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
10-year yield differentials 5-year yield differentials
Variable Coefficient and S.E. Wald p-value Coefficient and S.E. Wald p-value
Own Lag 0.956* 0.000 0.853* 0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Maturity 0.269* 0.000 0.232* 0.000
(0.041) (0.003)
Risk factor 0.172* 0.000 0.372* 0.000
(0.063) (0.032)
Bid-ask spread 0.047* 0.207 0.039* 0.000
(0.021) (0.008)
Interaction -0.064* 0.192 -0.087* 0.000
(0.033) (0.018)
Panel restriction 0.000 0.000
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TABLE 6
Robustness Analysis
The table reports robustness analysis for the SURE system on 10-year yield differentials. We consider three
alternative Risk Factors. R F 1 is the swap spread, R F 2 is the differential between yields on seasoned
U.S. BAA bonds and seasoned U.S. AAA bonds (the source for these data is the FRED database), R F 3
is the implied volatility in options on the EUROstoxx 50. The source for these data is Datastream.
Variable Sample Constant Own lag Maturity R F 1 R F 2 R F 3 Bid-ask Interaction
Austria 02-01-03:06 -0.135* 0.775* 0.285* 0.503* 0.05* -0.089*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.046) (0.011) (0.020)
02-01-03:12 -0.324* 0.811* 0.237* 0.388* 0.193* 0.035* -0.062*
(0.034) (0.018) (0.026) (0.052) (0.034) (0.010) (0.019)
02-01-03:12 -0.199* 0.813* 0.308* 0.492* 0.178* 0.031* -0.051*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.047) (0.032) (0.010) (0.020)
Belgium 02-01-03:06 -0.081* 0.906* 0.317* 0.433* 0.081* -0.14*
(0.018) (0.011) (0.034) (0.035) (0.019) (0.039)
02-01-03:12 -0.252* 0.925* 0.327* 0.384* 0.148* 0.042* -0.08*
(0.039) (0.009) (0.043) (0.053) (0.041) (0.019) (0.039)
02-01-03:12 -0.177* 0.917* 0.343* 0.488* 0.174* 0.042* -0.077*
(0.019) (0.008) (0.031) (0.033) (0.003) (0.019) (0.037)
Spain 02-01-03:06 -0.10* 0.77* 0.324* 0.465* 0.034† -0.06†
(0.017) (0.02) (0.045) (0.059) (0.019) (0.034)
02-01-03:12 -0.33* 0.82* 0.239* 0.284* 0.242* 0.02 0.006
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.073) (0.053) (0.02) (0.035)
02-01-03:12 -0.17* 0.83* 0.343* 0.417* 0.203* -0.002 0.025
(0.027) (0.048) (0.048) (0.059) (0.055) (0.019) (0.04)
Finland 02-01-03:06 -0.110* 0.953* 0.127† 0.433* -0.02 -0.017
(0.069) (0.009) (0.07) (0.15) (0.03) (0.06)
02-01-03:12 -0.377* 0.944* 0.166* 0.312* 0.250* -0.006 0.02
(0.07) (0.01) (0.043) (0.101) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
02-01-03:12 -0.190* 0.950* 0.282* 0.527* 0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.045) (0.006) (0.05) (0.107) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04)
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TABLE 6 (continued)
Variable Sample Constant Own lag Maturity R F 1 R F 2 R F 3 Bid-ask Interaction
France 02-01-03:06 -0.035 0.945* 0.053 0.184* 0.042 -0.062
(0.039) (0.02) (0.073) (0.069) (0.034) (0.067)
02-01-03:12 -0.176* 0.944* 0.212* 0.293* 0.057 0.01 -0.02
(0.069) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
02-01-03:12 -0.169* 0.930* 0.163* 0.307* 0.188* 0.01 -0.02
(0.033) (0.012) (0.06) (0.056) (0.056) (0.03) (0.06)
Italy 02-01-03:06 -0.027 0.88* 0.263* 0.242* 0.02 -0.042
(0.021) (0.02) (0.040) (0.043) (0.016) (0.039)
02-01-03:12 -0.108* 0.89* 0.270* 0.215* 0.114* 0.01 -0.03
(0.038) (0.02) (0.040) (0.043) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
02-01-03:12 -0.06* 0.86* 0.237* 0.292* 0.187* 0.014 -0.036
(0.015) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.023) (0.01) (0.028)
Netherl. 02-01-03:06 -0.076* 0.88* -0.07* 0.329* 0.046* -0.072*
(0.02) (0.012) (0.026) (0.037) (0.016) (0.032)
02-01-03:12 -0.183* 0.86* 0.28* 0.180* 0.130* 0.028* -0.042†
(0.03) (0.013) (0.025) (0.04) (0.03) (0.013) (0.026)
02-01-03:12 -0.097* 0.88* 0.33* 0.338* 0.333* 0.028 -0.031*
(0.02) (0.012) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (0.034) (0.014)
Portugal 02-01-03:06 -0.110* 0.890* 0.406* 0.598* 0.098* -0.173*
(0.013) (0.038) (0.044) (0.083) (0.029) (0.06)
02-01-03:12 -0.327* 0.90* 0.329* 0.436* 0.224* 0.06* -0.10†
(0.057) (0.012) (0.046) (0.095) (0.06) (0.027) (0.057)
02-01-03:12 -0.215* 0.870* 0.386* 0.589* 0.293* 0.049* -0.082*
(0.029) (0.013) (0.032) (0.061) (0.038) (0.020) (0.04)
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FIGURE 1
10-Year Yield Differentials in the Euro Area, Relative to German
Bonds
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FIGURE 2
Bid-Ask Spread Differentials in the Euro Area, Relative to
German Bonds
(10-year Benchmark Bonds, in Cents)
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FIGURE 3
First Principal Components of Euro-Area Yield Differentials and
the Spread Between the 10-Year Fixed Interest Rate on Swaps
and U.S. Government Bond Yield
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